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This dissertation is the result of a project, grounded in the consideration of 
‘time’ in the core courses of the ‘Literature and Modernity’ programme, into how the 
narrator[s] of and characters in W.G Sebald’s documentary fiction experience time, 
space, and distance as phenomena. It will deal with three of Sebald’s best-known 
works: The Emigrants (1992) and The Rings of Saturn (1995) both in translation by 
Michael Hulse, and Austerlitz (2001) in translation by Anthea Bell.* 
I acknowledge straight away that bracketing these three works together under 
‘documentary fiction’ is problematical. Sebald himself was prepared to allow that 
label for The Emigrants, but preferred to think of Austerlitz as “a long prose elegy” 
(Cuomo 103) or “a prose book of indefinite form” (Franklin 123). Christopher 
Maclehose, Sebald’s publisher for The Rings of Saturn, notes that when the author 
was asked what category he wanted the book to be listed in, he said “I’d like all the 
categories,” specifying fiction, biography, autobiography, travel, history, and so on – 
“There wasn’t a category he didn’t require” (Patience). Scrutiny of the rear cover of 
the Vintage edition of The Rings of Saturn reveals that the eventual three maximum 
allowed categories were “fiction/memoir/travel” even though it is perhaps the least 
fictive of the three works under consideration; the two categories for The Emigrants 
were fixed at “fiction/history,” neither description really doing justice to either book. 
Mark McCulloh is content to categorise The Emigrants as documentary fiction (xvii), 
and Angeliki Tseti notes Sebald’s blurring of the boundaries between fact and fiction 
                                                
* Permission was received in advance to study works entirely in translation, because of Sebald’s close 
involvement in the work of translation. 
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“to constitute an encounter between private stories and public histories [and]  
representations of personal narratives developing in the midst or aftermath of a 
historical calamity” (103). Lynn Wolff, who has written extensively on Sebald, 
challenges the idea that his writing can be categorised as documentary fiction at all: 
Such intertextuality and intermediality […] lends Sebald's works a documentary 
quality; yet, I would argue that his project differs from one of documentary 
fiction. The unmarked integration of quotes into the narrative, like images that 
are integrated without comment or annotation, reveals this fusion of 
historiography and literature that I see as unique to Sebald's prose; for it is not 
his main purpose to create a fiction that is historically substantiated through 
documentation. Rather he is problematising the writing process in addition to the 
standards by which we judge authenticity, documentary status, historical truth, 
and even truth in general.  
(320) 
In The Grammar of Identity Stephen Clingman coined the term ‘transfiction’ to 
describe Sebald’s “navigational form” of writing, declaring “[n]o one genre or mode 
is capable of capturing the truth” (188). However, the body of this dissertation will 
certainly show that there are sufficient similarities within the scope of the phenomena 
researched to justify selecting and bracketing these three texts together. 
Phenomena are encountered and experienced at the moment that they arise, 
and choosing such experience as a title and subject for this project must therefore, to 
some extent, involve a phenomenological approach. It is surprising that such an 
approach has been uncommon in studies of Sebald. Derek Mitchell’s book Everyday 
Phenomenology uses Sebald as an exemplar of phenomenology, along with Gaston 
Bachelard, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Martin Heidegger; but although he draws 
parallels, particularly between Bachelard and Sebald, the book in itself does not give a 
study of the author in the way this project envisages. Catalina Botez has written about 
peratology in Austerlitz, drawing on the work of Romanian phenomenologist Gabriel 
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Liiceanu, in a 2011 article in Literature & Aesthetics, which might be taken alongside 
Richard T. Gray’s non-phenomenological consideration of the Roche Limit in The 
Rings of Saturn, inasmuch as both deal with the liminal or the limiting in Sebald. But 
apart from a dissertation in 2007 by MA candidate Megan Cawood at the University 
of Cape Town, who used Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a guide to Austerlitz, not much 
more work has been found that probes Sebald from a phenomenological perspective. 
Therefore, whilst this dissertation makes no claim to be comprehensive, it 
does aim to open the door – or open the door wider – to further projects of this kind.  
It draws, for its guidance on phenomenology, from several sources. Firstly from 
Derek Mitchell’s book which, while it is not a major work, has some useful insights. 
Salient amongst them, and relevant to the present project, are the concepts of “place,” 
meaning a space that has a special significance for an individual consciousness, and 
“event,” meaning a time or an instant that has a special significance for an individual 
consciousness (6). To these phenomenological elements I add two of my own coining: 
“object,” meaning anything material or concrete that has such significance, and 
“vector,” which term I borrow from mathematics, meaning any direction of travel that 
has such significance. Whilst I should point out that the fourth term does not 
necessarily accord with its usage by Gaston Bachelard when he refers to the “vectorial 
character of [Bergson’s] duration” (Intuition 28), these terms will be used in the 
above senses throughout this dissertation. Secondly from the writing of Max van 
Manen who, although he does not attempt to turn phenomenology into a hard-and-fast 
‘method’, is very straightforward and comprehensible in his exposition. Van Manen 
concentrates on lived experiences, which he describes as “raw: prereflective, 
nonreflective, or atheoretic” (812). His relation of these to Edmund Husserl’s dictum 
“zu den Sachen selbst” – which he expounds as “turning to experience as lived 
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through” (811) – is very valuable when considering Sebald’s characters’ direct 
encounters with time and space. Thirdly from the works of Gaston Bachelard, who 
gives primacy to the instant above both duration and the linear perception of time, 
although Conrad Russell comments that, in Bachelard’s thinking, a discontinuous 
time which derives its dynamism from breaks and ruptures is more important than 
dogmatic insistence on the instant (6). Another major contribution Bachelard makes 
to this project is his skepticism for the very idea that phenomenology and literary 
criticism can go hand-in-hand. He says, in The Poetics of Space: 
[…] the phenomenologist has nothing in common with the literary critic who, as 
has been frequently noted, judges a work that he could not create and, if we are 
to believe some facile condemnations, would not want to create. A literary critic 
is a reader who is necessarily severe.  
(10) 
This is a chastening caveat to the researcher/writer who wishes to push through a 
hypothesis or methodology come what may. Beyond Bachelard’s warning, 
phenomenology has long had an uneasy relationship with literary criticism, not least 
of all because of what Robert Holub, contributing to The Cambridge History of 
Literary Criticism, calls its “protean” changeability (316). From Husserl, through 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre and existentialism, Bachelard, etc., and on to 
modern phenomenologists such as van Manen, the discipline – if it can be called such 
– has undergone profound changes and been subject to much criticism, particularly at 
the hands of poststructuralism. Holub speaks of phenomenology’s “perceived 
limitations,” and says: “Although criticism that calls itself phenomenological may 
continue […] the connection with the project Husserl developed during the first third 
of the [twentieth] century has all but vanished” (318). However, Bachelard’s granting 
primacy to the instant, to “the onset of the image” (4), and to “the phenomenological 
doublet of resonances and repercussions” (7) will prove to be useful, as it informs my 
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own position: that, without implying dualism, human consciousness does not deal 
with the totality of reality, but encounters a continuous sequence of phenomena which 
may bear a relationship to reality, but that relationship is neither measurable nor 
necessarily constant. Further, that each instantaneous encounter is a threshold to an 
unpredictable menu of what I call ‘associations’, cognate with Bachelard’s 
‘resonances’ but with the additional nuance that the relationship between a 
phenomenon and what it evokes is not necessarily appreciable and may well be 
arcane. Thus the phenomenological experience seems to have moved on from the 
“unbroken succession of situations” and from the “slide from one encounter to 
another” (Heidegger 92), to the possibility of associations that are startlingly 
disruptive. This dissertation aims, by giving priority to examining the texts, to show 
the ‘threshold’ nature of the instant in Sebald. 
Though this dissertation has an underlying structure, and is not a wholly 
phenomenological study in the strictest sense, its use of phenomenological principles 
means that it is more peregrinatory in nature than one might expect from a standard 
dissertation. This is in keeping with the intention to open possibilities for further 
studies, however. In the second chapter, which deals with The Rings of Saturn, I 
introduce initially the challenge of concentricity to the perceived linearity of a 
narrative. This is proposed in Richard T. Gray’s 2010 article “Writing at the Roche 
limit: Order and Entropy in W.G. Sebald’s Die Ringe des Saturn.” However, I go on 
from there to challenge both impositions of strict order upon The Rings of Saturn, and 
to argue in effect that time/event, space/place, and distance/direction/vector disrupt, 
and are disrupted within, the narrative. Several episodes from the text are drawn upon 
as examples and typifiers. In the third chapter I introduce The Emigrants, and use the 
Luisa Lanzberg memoir to explore the immediacy and imaginative creativity of 
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memory, showing how grammatical tense is used to convey the experience of the 
instant. I then trace the encounters the narrator and the characters have with the un-
named ‘Butterfly Man’; his identification as Vladimir Nabokov proves to be 
questionable, but is in fact far less important than considering each encounter as a 
phenomenon in its own right. The emphasis of that chapter is on the eccentricity of 
the characters’ travel, rather than the concentricity which is challenged in the second 
chapter. The Fourth chapter introduces Austerlitz and the concept of the elliptical 
vector of the eponymous Jacques Austerlitz. It deals with the novel’s apparent 
resistance to the expectation of a smooth transition from one instant, with all its 
associations, to the next. Austerlitz’s theory of time is contrasted with his experience 
of it, and the chapter introduces the ‘instant of aperture’, a concept more in keeping 
with Bachelard’s stress upon the importance of breaks and ruptures in time; the 
chapter goes on to relate the ‘instants of aperture’ to the apogees and perigees of 
Austerlitz’s elliptical travels. Exceptionally, rather than simply being a summary and 
coda, the final chapter tests the basic hypothesis of this dissertation. It speculates 
whether the meticulousness of the creation of The Rings of Saturn, The Emigrants, 
and Austerlitz militates against a phenomenological study, and examines whether all 
the steps up to and including translation have helped to enhance or diminish the 
distancing effect of periscopy. It goes on to deal with how far coincidences can be 
tolerated before credibility is strained, and examines whether in fact they serve to 
heighten the connectedness between the novels, and the experiences presented in 
them. Lastly it touches upon the reactions of some notable readers of The Rings of 
Saturn. The Whovian wordplay in the title of this dissertation, of course, refers to the 
travels that the denizens of Sebald’s cosmos make in space and time, how their travels 
are as unpredictable as those of the TARDIS, and how, as opposed to the interior of 
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that fictional vehicle, the interiors and places that contain them are often experienced 




The Rings of Saturn: Concentricity? 
 
This dissertation proper starts with The Rings of Saturn purely because, out of 
the three main works examined, it is the one which is written from a first-person 
perspective. As phenomenology is, essentially, a study of first-person experiences, it 
is entirely appropriate to start with Sebald’s least periscopic work. As it is ostensibly a 
description of a walking tour of Suffolk – an undertaking with a starting point and a 
destination – a similarly linear narrative line might be expected, taking in the few 
weeks after the “dog days” (3). Indeed this linearity could be extended to cover the 
term of a life, starting with a period when the narrator is, for once, momentarily 
“carefree” as an infant might be, and relieved of the matters of work that had 
dominated his adult consciousness (ibid.), and ending with a lost entry in Thomas 
Browne’s Pseudodoxia Epidemica describing the covering of all images of 
landscapes, fruits of the field, or people, in a house where a life had ended (296). This 
notion of linearity, however, is challenged straight away by another, that of 
concentricity. 
The semiotics of the image of Saturn with its rings are simple – they declare 
this concentricity. Sebald chose, for the title of his 1995 oeuvre, four words which 
instantly convey that image. On an unnumbered page in the paratext he included, as 
one of his epigraphs, a few words from the Brockhaus Encyclopaedia describing the 
probable formation of the planetary rings from a disintegrated moon. At the end of the 
excerpt there is a reference to a further entry in the encyclopaedia, citing simply “→ 
Roche limit,” being the point at which the gravitational force of a body tends to 
overwhelm the integrity of a satellite, causing the latter to fragment, but that force is 
 10 
not sufficient to cause the detritus of the fragmentation to fall out of orbit (Gray 39). It 
is upon this, along with a quotation from an interview with Uwe Pralle in which 
Sebald says “die äußeren Kreise determinieren immer die inneren” (ibid.: “the outer 
rings always set the limit of the inner”), that Richard T. Gray appears to base his 
cronological∗ interpretation of Sebald, maintaining that behind Sebald’s singular 
obsession with decline and destruction (ibid.) lies an ordering principle. In The Rings 
of Saturn, says Gray: 
[…] the focus on destruction and disorder is continually counterbalanced by an 
insistence on order and by often extremely subtle forms of organization. Sebald’s 
theme, as well as the structure of his text, can best be conceived in terms of a 
system that naturally tends toward entropy, but which yet attains relative 
equilibrium through the strategic application of specific ordering principles, in 
particular repetition, periodicity, and — understood literally — co-incidence. In 
Sebald’s case, this dynamic of order and disorder appears to be weighted more 
toward the negative extreme of decomposition and decline for the simple reason 
that he approaches traditional principles of rational order and systematic 
organization with a profound skepticism […]  
(40) 
Gray concedes that there is disorder, but the pointed italicisation of the word 
“appears” is intended to convey that the disorder is superficial, and subordinate to an 
underlying order. His contention is that the narrator’s journey “along the coastline of 
Suffolk emblematically choreograph[s] the traversal of just such a liminal, contested 
space, between the stability of terra firma and the destructive tidal forces of the sea,” 
and that “Sebald suggests that his narrator’s traversal […] represents a structural 
reiteration of the orbital path followed by the rings of Saturn” (43). 
                                                
∗ Cronology, in this context, is defined as the study of the planet Saturn, ‘Cronus’ being equivalent to 
Saturn in Greek mythology. 
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However, notwithstanding the quotation from the Brockhaus Encyclopaedia, 
which is a layman’s explanation, Sebald does not claim to be an astrophysicist or any 
kind of scientist. The Rings of Saturn describes a pilgrimage – Eine Englische 
Wallfahrt in its German original – a peregrination rather than a scientific exploration, 
and far from all of it specifically on the line of tidal contest. Science may be incisive, 
and may belong together with other ways of considering or perceiving the human 
experience to build up the totality of that experience, but Sebald reminds us that “[a] 
walker’s approach to viewing nature is a phenomenological one” (Patience), a matter 
first and foremost of subjective experience. In that experience each moment is a 
threshold, and not necessarily subject to an a priori structure for where it leads. As an 
academic researcher, Sebald did not rely on a systematic approach; his research was 
always “done in a random, haphazard fashion […] in the same way in which, say, a 
dog runs through a field” (Schütte 47),  and his photographs, some of which he placed 
in his books, were also collected randomly from junk shops and the like (Jaggi). It is 
valid to ask, therefore, why someone with a clear propensity for randomness chose to 
signal concentricity with such an emblematic title, and to foreword the book with a 
reference including an expression of scientific equilibrium. It is the contention of this 
chapter that it was to transgress them. 
On the first page of The Rings of Saturn, where Sebald introduces the subject 
of the walking tour, the narrator is suddenly and violently wrenched out of the time 
and space of that tour and is “taken into hospital in Norwich in an almost total state of 
immobility” (3). The “expanses of Suffolk” had, he felt, “shrunk once and for all to a 
single, blind, insensate spot” (4). The narration has brought us the severest contraction 
of space imaginable, and the “once and for all” suggests that this immobile state in 
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this confined space is going to be the setting for a purely mental journey*, as though 
this hospital room were the dense source of gravity – the core of the planet Saturn – 
around which the regular rings of what was to follow in the book were to revolve. 
However, Sebald’s narrator is peculiarly careless – even if he is not actually carefree 
– with the rigour of both linearity and concentricity. Dragging himself to the window 
in that confining hospital room, he looks out not on anything that could be thought of 
as being the next concentric ring, but rather into an entirely alien landscape, devoid of 
any reference to where he actually was, “as if I were looking down from a cliff upon a 
sea of stone or a field of rubble” (5). With appreciable frequency in The Rings of 
Saturn the narrator uses a phrase which begins “as if” or “as though,” signaling an 
approximate similarity to something. In doing so, he is answering “the basic 
phenomenological question […] “What is this experience like?”” (van Manen 811), 
but equally, by stopping short of stating exact equivalence, he leaves the comparison 
open to further or different associations. The narrator is setting down an experience of 
time as a slide from one encounter into another (Heidegger 92) that negates Richard 
Gray’s declaration of Sebald’s “strategic application of specific ordering principles” 
(Gray 40, my emphasis). Max van Manen offers the following, effectively a rebuttal 
to the notion of system and order: 
In contrast with the promises of systematic procedural analysis, the problem for 
phenomenological researchers is that such insight cannot necessarily be secured 
by means of a formulaic set of steps, or a recipe approach, and yet, 
phenomenological inquiry involves “method” but method and analysis 
understood in a nonmethodical sense. 
(820) 
The same can be said of both phenomenological writing and reading, of course, and 
the latter will be touched upon in the final chapter of this dissertation. There is little 
                                                
* Ian Sinclair does refer to The Rings of Saturn as “a mental landscape” (Patience). 
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evidence of the systematic or the ordered in Sebald’s narrator’s mental processes 
when, in fairly rapid succession within the discourse time of The Rings of Saturn, he 
admits that he “[…] couldn’t help thinking […]” about Kafka’s Gregor Samsa, or 
about his own friend Michael Parkinson (5). Here the narrator’s thoughts – will he nill 
he – freely associate, draw him away with a “multiplicity of resonances” (Bachelard, 
Space 7) from any ordered process. In terms of narrative time three years have been 
skipped within three pages, from the setting-out on the tour, via the confinement in 
the hospital room, to the assembling of the notes; but within the discourse Sebald has 
answered the challenge of phenomenology, which is “to recover the lived meanings of 
[each] moment without objectifying these faded meanings and without turning the 
lived meanings into positivistic themes, sanitized concepts, objectified descriptions, 
or abstract theories” (van Manen 812). Within the next three pages of The Rings of 
Saturn the narrator conducts us, via thoughts of Michael Parkinson, the outward-and-
inward trajectory of his travels, his work, his modesty, and his sudden death, to the 
office of Flaubert-scholar Janine Dakyns (5-8) – the latter being a space filled with 
piles of paper and as confining as his hospital room – without losing any sense of the 
immediacy of an unbroken succession of situations (Heidegger 92) or of the lived 
meanings of any moment. 
Outward-and-inward trajectories and partial trajectories, documented and 
imagined, do recur in The Rings of Saturn, of course – Sebald records his subjects’ 
itineraries, Bad Kissingen to Regensburg via Denmark, France, and Italy (86), Le 
Havre to the West Indies (110), Marseilles to Newcastle via Constantinople, Yeysk, 
Lowestoft, and London (113). Indeed he appears to support, by citation, Thomas 
Browne’s view that  
[…] the history of every individual, of every social order, indeed of the whole 
world, does not describe an ever-widening, more and more wonderful arc, but 
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rather follows a course which, once the meridian is reached, leads without fail 
down into the dark.  
(24) 
Rather than endorsing the equilibrium of the Roche limit, however, Browne’s quoted 
view suggests the inevitability of spiraling inward and downward. But escape from 
both this posited law and the Roche limit is possible, if only figuratively. In the 
section of the book which deals with the atrocities of the Ustaše as a microcosm of the 
Holocaust, mention is made of a minor bureaucrat in the Wehrmacht, stationed in 
Banja Luka, who went on to become Secretary General of the United Nations, and 
who, in the form of his recorded voice, is currently leaving the Solar system on board 
Voyager II (99), with a vector unhampered by the gravitational pull of the central 
body.  
All these trajectories occur, of course, within the consciousness of the 
narrator; they are his instant-driven train of thought, his musings, even as they relate 
to the lives of others – Browne, the Brazilian natives brought to Haarlem to dance 
(83), Joseph Conrad, etc. Paradoxically, they disrupt the idea of a wander through the 
Suffolk countryside, whilst they retain a continuity with that peregrination within the 
pilgrim’s consciousness. He notices a boat apparently motionless on the North Sea, 
then, distracted by the rising of the wind and darkening of the sky, he suddenly 
realises that the boat has gone, and his thoughts connect this both to Christ’s calming 
the Sea of Galilee and his driving the Gadarene swine off a cliff (65-66). Such 
instants bring about irrevocable change, and it is easy for the narrator to declare that 
“[i]t takes just one awful second […] and an entire epoch passes” (31). There are 
passages in The Rings of Saturn that seem to echo Henri Bergson’s concept of “pure 
duration,” which, he says, “is the form which the succession of our conscious states 
assumes when our ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state 
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from its former states” (Bergson 100). The waitress in a café who “may have 
appeared the moment I put down my knife and fork, or perhaps an hour had passed” 
(Rings 43); the narrator sitting by a lakeside believing he gazed into eternity (59); the 
periscopic observation that “[s]simply raising a hand, closing an eyelid, or exhaling 
one’s last breath might take, it sometimes seemed, half a century” (150-151). Each 
one of these, however, is dependent on the impression made by an instant, and the last 
one is followed by a procession of appearances – Bachelardian resonances in the 
narrator’s train of thought – relating to the Chinese famine. 
Thus so much can be seen in The Rings of Saturn that is a personal encounter 
with time as a phenomenon, everything as an “event” (Mitchell 6), or as “multiplying 
conscious instants,” as Bachelard posited in opposition to Bergson’s durée (Intuition 
50). The narrator similarly encounters space. He recalls how, in an “immense domed 
rotunda” (Rings 124) he viewed a diorama of the Battle of Waterloo: 
This, then, I thought, as I looked round about me, is the representation of history. 
It requires a falsification of perspective. We, the survivors, see everything from 
above, see everything at once, and still we do not know how it was. 
(125) 
The space of the rotunda is contradictory. It is “immense” and appears to hold an 
entire battlefield, yet that appearance is achieved by the device of foreshortening, by 
containing a miniaturized battle in the constraints of a space much smaller on the 
inside than on the outside. The falsification of perspective is given the significance of 
the falsification of history – ultimately we cannot ‘experience’ history as such, merely 
look at its debris (Benjamin 257-258) – which in turn relates to Sebald’s own concern, 
the falsification of Holocaust history by collusion in silence about it (Schütte 46). 
Thus the space holding the diorama becomes a “place,” and the narrator’s experience 
within it an “event” (Mitchell 6). 
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Time/space as event/place come together again, during the narrator’s 
peregrination, on the heath beyond Dunwich. He emerges from a thicket onto the 
heath and follows a track across it: 
Lost in the thoughts that went round in my head incessantly, and numbed by this 
crazed flowering, I stuck to the sandy path until to my astonishment, not to say 
horror, I found myself back again at the same tangled thicket from which I had 
emerged about an hour before, or, as it now seemed to me, in some distant past.  
(Rings 171) 
What might at first seem again like Bergsonian durée – the perceived duration of the 
narrator’s time on the heath before arriving back where he had emerged – is more 
evidential of a Bachelardian “reverie” (Reverie 29). The narrator is lost in thoughts, 
only partly conscious of time passing and distance covered, and these thoughts not 
necessarily the “masculine” state of mind (ibid.) of rational thought, but rather, as 
Derek Mitchell puts it in Everyday Phenomenology, “thinking in an unsystematised 
way not governed by the rules of empirical perception or scientific investigation […] 
almost not like thinking at all” (82). Thus it is the intervention of an instant of 
astonishment and horror in that space where dense gorse and open heath meet that 
reveals its significance as a place. That significance leads to further associations, 
occurring to the narrator as real-time memories: 
Only in retrospect did I realize that the only discernible landmark on this treeless 
heath, a most peculiar villa with a glass-domed observation tower which 
reminded me somehow of Ostend, had presented itself time and again from a 
quite different angle, now close to, now further off, now to my left and now to 
my right, and indeed at one point the lookout tower, in a sort of castling move, 
had got itself, in no time at all, from one side of the building to the other, so that 
it seemed that instead of seeing the actual villa I was seeing its mirror image.  
(Rings 171-172) 
Images of the villa with its dome, no matter how eidetic – imbued with hallucinatory 
clarity – those images are, afford some tenuous associations with Belgium, and 
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thereby recall to the reader the dome of the Waterloo diorama. Thoughts travel 
instantaneously and momentarily outside the immediate space; perspective, distance, 
and relative position change, contradicting each other and themselves. In order to 
break free of the heath, the narrator attempts to progress by rational observation, but, 
before he makes his escape, is overtaken by the irrational: 
[…] I had no choice but to keep to the crooked sandy tracks and to make mental 
notes of even the least significant features, even the slightest shift in perspective. 
Several times I was forced to retrace long stretches in that bewildering terrain, 
which could perhaps be surveyed in its entirety only from the glass tower of that 
spectral Belgian villa. In the end I was overcome by a feeling of panic.  
(172) 
The domed building has an unreal, phantom-like presence rather than solidity as an 
object, a kind of “spectral materialism” which “serves to register and archive a certain 
real whose status is, paradoxically, virtual” (Santner 52), and thereby holds on to its 
significance. 
Another encounter where the spectral, the historical, and the immediate 
coincide can be found in the section of the book describing the narrator’s visit to 
Orford Ness. He describes it “as if I were passing through an undiscovered country” 
(Rings 234). The intertextuality here is Shakespearean, the “undiscover’d country, 
from whose bourn / No traveller returns” (Hamlet III i ll.78-79) being death. The 
narrator, however, transgresses Browne’s law of the inevitable fall into the dark 
(Rings 24); he hires his Charon to take him over the Styx (233), but eventually 
reverses the katabasis when the same boatman brings him back (237). But as he 
makes his first few steps on the Ness, through a landscape of profound silence and 
emptiness, the latter matching the lack of conscious thoughts in his head and the 
former his growing sense of fear, he startles and is startled by a hare:  
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In that very fraction of a second when its paralysed state turned into panic and 
flight, its fear cut right through me. I still see what occurred in that one 
tremulous instant with an undiminished clarity.  
(234) 
The narrator claims eidetic recall of that instant, such is the vividness of the memory. 
Yet Conrad Russell, summing up Bachelard’s understanding of memory, declares it to 
be “fictive”, relying for its vividness on a creative process involving the imagination 
(Russell 14). Imagination, to Bachelard, is a major power of human nature (Space 18) 
“ceaselessly imagining and enriching itself with new images” (20). I suggest that the 
immediacy of the narrator’s reliving of the instant of his encounter with the hare is 
best expressed by Bachelard thus: “By the swiftness of its actions, the imagination 
separates us from the past as well as from reality” (31). 
Not until later – half an hour’s narrative time – when the narrator’s pulse had 
calmed down, does he begin to lose his sense that he is in the underworld. He 
approaches tomb-like structures: 
But the closer I came to these ruins, the more any notion of a mysterious isle of 
the dead receded, and the more I imagined myself amidst the remains of our own 
civilization after its extinction in some future catastrophe. To me too, as for 
some latter-day stranger ignorant of the nature of our society wandering about 
among heaps of scrap metal and defunct machinery, the beings who had once 
lived and worked here were an enigma, as was the purpose of the primitive 
contraptions and fittings inside the bunkers, the iron rails under the ceilings, the 
hooks on the still partially tiled walls, the showerheads the size of plates, the 
ramps and the soakaways. Where and in what time I truly was that day at 
Orfordness I cannot say, even now as I write these words. 
(Rings 237) 
In this passage we have again the narrator’s slide from one encounter into another 
(Heidegger 92) as he closes on the tumuli, the creativity of the imagination imbuing 
each object seen with arcane significance even though the overall impression is 
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enigmatic and time is compressed, almost annihilated. In this contradictory place, 
even distance is close to annihilation, as he looks back to the mainland: “The roofs 
and towers of Orford showed among the tree tops, seeming so close I could touch 
them” (Rings 237). 
Before leaving the encounters with time, space, and distance in The Rings of 
Saturn, this chapter will deal briefly with one further, periscopic instance of the 
contraction of space. In pages 242 to 248, the narrator records a visit to Thomas 
Abrams, whose ongoing task is a scale model of the Temple at Jerusalem. Abrams 
tells him that “the entire work is based on ideas, nothing but ideas, ideas that change 
over the years,” and that often have to be abandoned and reimagined (245). 
Bachelard, seeing miniaturisation as a factor of space, would say “[s]pace calls for 
action, and before action, the imagination is at work” (Space 34). It would be easy to 
see Sebald’s miniaturist as deploying logical thought processes, as per Bachelard’s 
statement that “[a] geometrician sees exactly the same thing in two similar figures, 
drawn to different scales” (167). However, if Bachelard’s insistence that before 
Abrams set to work making or even designing his model, he must have imagined it, is 
combined with the assertion that “imagination in miniature is natural imagination” 
(168), we can assign to the miniaturist a knowledge of  “intimate immensity” (201) 
and the malleability of the sense of space. The model-in-progress, sprung from the 
imagination, has since its inception and provisional realisation become an object with 
its own gravity, attracting visitors from all over the world (Rings 243-244). 
There is much more to draw on in The Rings of Saturn, but the foregoing 
examples give a sufficient view of the transgressive nature of the work, and of the 
difficulty in conceding that it depends on system and method. To concede so after 
having seen so much transgression, would be to liken the construction of the book to 
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the military architecture of Antwerp, where the fortifications made their way steadily 
outwards in concentric circles until they came up against the “natural” limit of their 
usefulness, given the advances in military technology (Austerlitz 17). More important 
to The Rings of Saturn is its immediacy, which is achieved despite the book’s 
grammar being entirely in the past tense – in fact it is so immediate that it is easy to 
forget that the narrator told us it was created from notes collated two years after the 
peregrination took place. The next chapter, which deals with Sebald’s earlier novel, 
The Emigrants, will touch upon, inter alia, how verbal tense can be varied to express 




The Emigrants: Eccentricity. 
 
Writing about The Emigrants, André Aciman said “[…] Sebald never brings 
up the Holocaust. The reader, meanwhile, thinks of nothing else” (6). In The Rings of 
Saturn the ethnic cleansing of Croatia by the Ustaše and the peripheral involvement of 
Kurt Waldheim (Rings 96-99), as noted in the previous chapter, and a peripheral 
reference to Bergen Belsen (59), along with the reminiscences of a Suffolk man about 
the wartime bombers setting off from the East Anglian airfields (38-40), serve to 
highlight almost in passing Sebald’s dual concerns – the silence about the Holocaust 
and about the destruction of German cities by Allied bombing. In this chapter the 
focus is on the earlier novel in which, as Aciman notes, Sebald deals “[s]upremely 
tact[fully]” with the Holocaust (6) by featuring the stories of characters “déracinés” 
(Williams 68) from central Europe during the first half of the twentieth century, rather 
than those subjected directly to the full horrors of Nazi mass-murder. Sebald seems to 
be telling us, as subtly as he might, that they did not ‘escape’ but are equally victims 
with those who were murdered. The Emigrants is more periscopic than The Rings of 
Saturn, inasmuch as the narrator allows his characters’ consciousness to emerge; in 
fact there is an important sub-section in the novel where the narrative can be said to 
be third-hand – when Max Ferber hands the narrator the memoir written by his great-
aunt Luisa Lanzberg. It is valid to ask whether this distancing from the narrator’s 
consciousness does anything to lessen the sense of immediacy in encounters with 
space, time, and distance, and the Lanzberg memoir, being the furthest back in 
chronological time, is a good place to start. 
It is, of course, actually a first-hand and first-person account, not a third-hand 
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at all. The author’s/narrator’s reading it, is no different from our reading his personal 
account within the novel. Moreover it is not the only such excursion in The 
Emigrants, from the consciousness of the narrator or from that of the characters he 
meets or has met personally. Sebald also includes a lengthy extract apparently from 
the diaries of Ambros Adelwarth (Emigrants 126-145), and if there are actual second- 
or third-hand accounts at all, they are to be found in Lucy Landau’s filling-in of the 
details of Paul Bereyter’s life, and the similar detailing of Ambros Adelwarth’s by 
Aunt Fini and Dr. Abramsky. The Lanzberg memoir is one of the devices by which 
Sebald “seeks to reconstruct a series of events which took place before his birth but 
which are accessible through neither purely ‘historical’ research nor personal 
recollection” (Long 123), specifically pivoting on 1905 when, for Luisa, childhood 
ended with her family’s removal to Kissingen (Emigrants 207). This event can be 
taken to be emblematic of the general uprooting of people and peoples during the 
twentieth century. 
The text slides almost unnoticed from the overall narrator’s voice to that of the 
memoirist. Translator Michael Hulse signals the change parenthetically – “(Luisa 
writes)” and he does the same at a later point (194, 207) – where the original German 
text is subtler, “wie Luisa schreibt” being isolated only by commas, as is the later 
instance (Ausgewanderten 290, 311). Sebald’s original construction appears more 
seamless, but he allowed Hulse’s more disruptive rendering. Nevertheless it is 
difficult to tell precisely where in the English-language description of the route 
between Steinach and Bad Kissingen the transition from consciousness to 
consciousness actually takes place, even though it continues for at least a page in the 
third-person. It has certainly changed by the end of the first paragraph, where the 
first-person takes over. Luisa gives a brilliantly eidetic account – ‘eidetic’ as defined 
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in the previous chapter and as used throughout this dissertation – of being in her 
childhood home:  
Now I am standing in the living room once again […] I have walked through the 
gloomy, stone-flagged hall, have placed my hand cautiously on the handle, as I 
do almost every morning at that time, I have pushed it down and opened the 
door, and inside, standing barefoot on the white, scrubbed floorboards, I look 
around in amazement at all the nice things in the room.  
(195) 
This is not simply an account of the past, it is a memory occurring in Luisa’s creative 
imagination in the instant before she writes it down, showing again that “before 
action, the imagination is at work” (Bachelard, Space 34). That instant both is a 
threshold, in the sense given to it in the introductory chapter to this dissertation, and 
significantly contains the image of a threshold – the door to a place, the living room in 
Steinach. The instant is both an event in itself and the onset of a remembered event. 
There is the sense of a precedent gloom leading up to that threshold, its having been 
lived through signaled by the present perfect verbs. The immediacy of the present and 
continuous present verbs reinforces the tactile memory of being barefoot, the 
brightness of the “white scrubbed floorboards,” and the completeness of the roll-call 
of objects contained in the room (Emigrants 195). Poignant amongst those objects is 
the picture of her aunt, “the most beautiful girl for miles around, a real Germania” 
(ibid.). The immersion and integration into German society of its Jewish community 
is recalled not only by that “Germania” but also by unselfconscious references to 
speeches in praise of the fatherland, loyalty and service to the state (202-203), and so 
on: 
There are no lessons today [the teacher’s birthday]; instead, stories and German 
legends of old are read aloud. We also have a guessing game. For instance, we 
have to guess three things that give and take in infinite plenty. Of course no one 
knows the answer, which Herr Bein then tells us in tones of great significance: 
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the earth, the sea, and the Reich.  
(204) 
“Reich” has been allowed to stand in translation; it refers to the German Empire of 
1871-1918, although of course it has more than a hint of dramatic irony in its modern 
association with the later German polity that was to sweep away European Jewry less 
than half a century after the events being remembered, and as the memoir was being 
written. Sebald allows Hulse’s translation to manipulate time, to foreshorten it in 
effect. Luisa’s recollection of the living room continues in crystalline detail: 
The hoya plant is on the cane table in the bay of the east window. Its leaves are 
firm and dark, and it has a lot of pink-hearted umbels consisting of white, furry 
stars. When I come down early in the mornings the sun is already shining into 
the room and gleaming on the drops of honey that cling to every little star.  
(196) 
There is a comforting glow to this passage. As Bachelard says: “When we dream of 
the house we were born in, in the utmost depths of revery, we participate in this 
original warmth” (Space 29), and this is the essence of the warm, domestic “nest” 
(111 et seq.). The phrase “a lot of pink-hearted umbels consisting of white, furry 
stars” seems to meld adult and childlike phraseology. The use of the present tense 
changes from immediate to general, signifying a sequence of comfortingly identical 
or similar events – “When I come down early in the mornings […]” – and continues 
in that mode. “On Sunday afternoon Papa does his accounts […] Mama sits in the 
living room with Papa, reading the Münchner Neueste Nachrichten […]” (Emigrants 
199) shows the “leading characters” of the “theater of the past that is constituted by 
memory” centre stage as the scene is replayed and replayed (Bachelard, Space 30, 
36). Commenting on Bachelard, and relevant to passages like this, Conrad Russell 
notes that memory, even that of such eidetic clarity as Luisa Lanzberg’s, is not a 
photographic record, but is “cinematic,” “fictive,” and, as has been mentioned before, 
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closely involves the imagination (11, 14).  
 When the memoir narrative moves away from her early life in Steinach there 
is at once a change of grammatical tense. It enters with this statement: “childhood 
ended in January 1905 when the house and fields were auctioned off and we moved 
into a new three-storey house in Kissingen […]” and is signaled by the use of past 
tenses (Emigrants 207). These continue throughout the description of life in Bad 
Kissingen. The immediate experience of memory has changed in the way the 
memoirist feels it. She says that it is difficult to think back to her youth in that town, 
and that “there is a good deal I can no longer picture” (208). Despite that protestation, 
however, the reminiscences continue for another nine pages or so. The change in tone 
has, obliquely, answered the basic phenomenological question, “What [was] this 
experience like?” (van Manen 811), and it is answered more directly where the 
memoirist mentions that on reading a postcard album she “felt like a visitor, passing 
through” (Emigrants 210).  
During an isolated day of summer happiness in Kissingen, Luisa Lanzberg 
overtakes two Russian gentlemen and “a boy of about ten who had been chasing 
butterflies” (213). Thus she encounters, on his eccentric, zig-zag trajectory through 
the book, Sebald’s most enigmatic traveller in time and space – the Butterfly Man. 
The presence of this unnamed lepidopterist, as a kind of ‘Wandering Gentile’ amongst 
the mainly Jewish and part-Jewish characters, assumed to be and indeed 
acknowledged almost apologetically by Sebald to be Vladimir Nabokov, is largely 
unexplained. Nabokov’s wife was Jewish of course, and his travels through and out of 
Europe during the early mid-twentieth century gave him a unique perspective on the 
rise of Nazism, its racially destructive policies, and the experience of people forced to 
flee it. Even so, his presence could be speculated as a reminder that Jewish and gentile 
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strata of society were, despite Nazi claims, inextricable, and that also one could be a 
gentile déraciné. However, Sebald himself would not offer much of an explanation of 
the way that the mysterious and the realistic were interwoven in The Emigrants. All 
we have from him about the Butterfly Man is, in effect, this quote, embedded in an 
article by Oliver Sill:  
“Daher muß es solche halb greifbaren, halb abstrakten Figuren geben (wie den 
Schmetterlingsfänger), die eine bestimmte, nicht ganz zu durchschauende 
Funktion haben.” (Sill 599, “So there have to be such half-tangible, half-
abstract characters – like the butterfly-catcher – that have a definite but not 
entirely transparent function.” 
[my translation]) 
This could be seen as a device entirely in harmony with Sebald’s “spectral 
materialism” (Santner 52) as previously noted in Chapter 2. 
This lack of full transparency is evident in that the Butterfly Man does not 
need to be, and might not actually be, Nabokov. The first-identified character with an 
interest in insects is one Edwin Elliott (Emigrants 12), but there are no further clues 
that might identify him as the traveller, apart from an approximation of age. The 
second-identified character is Dr. Henry Selwyn, whom the narrator sees in a 
projected photograph in knee-length shorts with a shoulder bag and a butterfly net 
(15), and is therefore positively identified as a, if not the, Butterfly Man. The narrator 
notices a striking resemblance between that photo of Selwyn, and one of Nabokov 
that he had previously clipped from a magazine (16). At that point in the text Sebald 
inserts a photograph; because it is captionless it may or may not be the photo referred 
to in the text, and there is no clue given as to whether it is Selwyn, Nabokov, or a 
third party. An internet search nowadays would establish that it is in fact Nabokov, 
but no such facility was widely available at the time that The Emigrants was written 
and published, and the inserted photograph brings with it a sense of uncertainty. In 
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fact, in noting the resemblance of the clipped photo to the projected photo, the 
narrator has been the first person within the novel’s discourse time to encounter a/the 
Butterfly Man and, in that instant, to make the association that answered van Manen’s 
already cited question, “What is [seeing this image] like?” The issue of whom we are 
to take as being the Butterfly Man who subsequently appears throughout the novel is 
not relevant to that instantaneous experience. 
It does, however, lead on to consideration of the further encounters as 
phenomena. In the Ambros Adelwarth section of the novel the ephemeral traveller’s 
presence is poignant, as it comes at a time when the personality of the once widely-
travelled Uncle Adelwarth is deteriorating, and the mental and physical space he 
inhabits is contracting. He is more-or-less confined to his own room and the ECT 
treatment room in the sanatorium in Ithaca. In the former he seems obsessed with 
looking out of his window for a strange but regular visitor in the nearby landscape; 
Aunt Fini reports standing with him and seeing “a middle-aged man […] holding a 
white net on a pole in front of him and occasionally taking curious jumps” (104). The 
sight has intruded on her recalling a resemblance between the view from the window 
and one of the Altach marsh in Austria, and has caused bewilderment by its 
incongruity. Uncle Adelwarth remarks “It’s the butterfly man, you know. He comes 
round here quite often” (ibid.). The apparition remains unnamed, although as 
Nabokov lived in Ithaca from 1953 to 1961 the likelihood of correlating him with the 
ephemeral lepidopterist is strong; however, as so often with Sebald, this is a vague 
tease, as who is to say that the well-travelled Dr. Selwyn could not have hunted 
butterflies during a vacation in New York State as easily as he could have in Crete? 
But the attempt to catch the butterfly, a metaphor for the human mind and soul, is 
what gives this episode its poignancy and irony – that shortly afterwards “the extent 
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of the harm that had been done [by ECT] to Uncle’s spirit and body was becoming 
clearer” (ibid.). The Butterfly Man is linked to Uncle Adelwarth’s final retreat into his 
contracted personal place, when he misses the appointment for what was to be his 
final ECT session, and is found by his doctor staring out of the window; he excuses 
himself with “It must have slipped my mind whilst I was waiting for the butterfly 
man” (115). There is no clue there whether the awaited event actually happened, 
whether the Butterfly Man actually did make an appearance on Uncle Adelwarth’s 
last day. In this section of the novel the unmarked integration of quotes into the 
overall narrative, as noted already by Lynn Wolff (320) in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, causes that narrative to slide without interruption from the narrator’s 
consciousness to the subject’s via two separate levels of periscopy, without disrupting 
the received perception of an inevitable flow of instants with their attendant 
associations. 
In the Max Ferber section, that perception is shifted to another medium, that of 
painting. Ferber’s studio in Manchester recalls, in its constriction and confinement, 
Ambros Adelwarth’s room in the sanatorium, the hospital room of the narrator in The 
Rings of Saturn (3-5), and more particularly Janine Dakyns’s study with its piles of 
paper (8-9). The build-up of clutter in Ferber’s room was not uniform, as that in 
Dakyns’s, but made up of a plethora of put-aside objects (Emigrants 160-161), and 
principally of a mixture of dust and flakes of paint, the latter the by-product of 
Ferber’s constant effacement with a palette knife and reapplication of paint: 
This, said Ferber, was the true product of his continuing endeavours and the 
most palpable proof of his failure. It had always been of the greatest importance 
to him […] that nothing should change at his place of work, that everything 
should remain as it was, as he had arranged it, and that nothing further should be 
added but the debris generated by painting and the dust that continuously fell and 




Ferber had been one of the Jewish children taken out of Germany by the 
‘Kindertransport’. His vector had been a one-way trajectory, and had led inexorably 
to this almost total confinement – “I cannot leave [Manchester], I do not want to 
leave, I must not […] I often don’t leave the house or workshop for weeks on end” 
(169) – and to the loss of his German language and identity and any sense of what his 
former country might have become (181-182). He had attempted to travel in the past, 
and it was on a mountainside near Lake Geneva that he had encountered the Butterfly 
Man. He might not have resisted the urge to hurl himself from the mountain 
[…] had not a man of about sixty suddenly appeared before him – like someone 
who’s popped out of the bloody ground. He was carrying a large white gauze 
butterfly net and said, in an English voice that was refined but quite unplaceable, 
that it was time to be thinking of going down if one were to be in Montreux in 
time for dinner.  
(174) 
The period between that encounter and his eventual return to his studio, so striking 
was the event itself, had become since then lost in a “lagoon of oblivion” (ibid.). he 
had tried to recapture it by working for a full year on a “faceless” portrait of “Man 
with a Butterfly Net”  (ibid.), but despite both the apparent significance and 
memorability of the event, and the intent in his imagination to realise the work of art, 
all he succeeded in producing was more scraped-off flakes of paint on his studio floor. 
Thus the Butterfly Man remained faceless and unidentified, his unplaceable accent 
possibly that of the Russian Nabokov or the Lithuanian Selwyn. This non-
identification and the ceaseless attempt to recall by the medium of paint may well be 
one of Sebald’s many ways of emblematising the great losses of the twentieth 
century, but equally the lived experience of painting and scraping in the confining 
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studio has in its own right, for Ferber, taken on an instant-to-instant significance. The 
application and effacement of paint is, by use of a specific expressive medium, an 
answer to the question “what is the experience of forgetting like?” 
Identifying the butterfly-chasing boy of about ten in Luisa Lanzberg’s account 
as Nabokov is again a matter of conjecture. The encounter took place in the year she 
turned twenty-one, and if she was sixteen in 1905 (195) that would make its date 1910 
when Nabokov was indeed about ten or eleven. But it is not so much that that is 
significant, but the later event in 1913 when her friend Fritz Waldhof proposes to her:  
I did not know what to reply, but I nodded, and, though everything else around 
me blurred, I saw that long-forgotten Russian boy as clearly as anything, leaping 
about the meadows with his butterfly net; I saw him as a messenger of joy, 
returning from that distant summer day to open his specimen box and release the 
most beautiful red admirals, peacock butterflies, brimstones and tortoiseshells to 
signal my final liberation.  
(214) 
This is precisely what I was referring to in Chapter 1 when I mentioned ‘associations’. 
What each instant is threshold to is neither predictable nor superficially logical. The 
marriage proposal evokes and releases the apparently unrelated yet eidetic image of 
the earlier event, which itself releases a creatively-imagined, almost oneiric pageant 
of colourful butterflies. The associations are free associations, and Luisa is providing 
yet another answer to the basic phenomenological question, with the butterflies 
standing for what her experience of joy and liberation is like.  
The unpredictability extends to these co-incidences of the Butterfly Man’s 
trajectory with those of the eponymous emigrants. When Joseph Cuomo commented 
that it was remarkable that Sebald never used these coincidences toward some end, 
the author responded “Well it would trivialize it. Nevertheless it has significance” 
(Cuomo 97). He rejected the retrospective arrangement of coincidences, in the style of 
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an Agatha Christie novel, as mere “sleight of hand” (Sebald and Zeeman 26). He 
stated that the presence of such things as the newspaper story about the man, a friend 
of Dr. Selwyn, whose body was recovered from a glacier (Emigrants 23) was meant 
“to unsettle the reader” (Sebald and Zeeman 26). This will be touched upon further in 
the final chapter of this dissertation. The narrative style of The Emigrants, with its 
barely signaled movement from one consciousness to another, is an attempt to convey 
the state of mind of those set adrift by forces beyond their understanding and control, 
the narrator and each character being, to some extent, a loner with no one else 






In The Emigrants, Sebald used the disintegration of his characters – Ambros 
Adelwarth’s succumbing to ECT, Max Ferber’s self-confinement to Manchester and 
to his studio, and the suicides of Henry Selwyn and Paul Bereyter – as emblems for 
the irrecoverable loss of European Jewry, of its culture, and of its integration in the 
strata of society. Considering that the attitude of Nazism to the Jews of central 
Europe, whether emigrants or deportees to the concentration camps, may be summed 
up by the phrase from the bureaucracy of Theresienstadt "Rückkehr Nicht Erwünscht" 
– "Return Not Desired" (Austerlitz 338) – it seems surprising that the vectors of at 
least two of the Ausgewanderten, Paul Bereyter and Jacques Austerlitz, have an 
element of the ellipse. For the purpose of this dissertation, Jacques Austerlitz will, for 
many reasons which will become clear during this chapter, be counted as one 
of Sebald's eponymous emigrants, as the book which carries his name as a title returns 
directly to the author's/narrator's concern and theme of the Jewish and Jewish-
associated déracinés. The fact that both Bereyter and Austerlitz made journeys back 
to a personal point of origin lends irony to the Nazi dictum, and both men may be 
counted as much as Zurückgewanderten as Ausgewanderten. This is not to say either 
that their elliptical vectors can be called regular or direct, nor that the perigee of their 
ellipses brought about an optimal resolution. In the case of Paul Bereyter it brought 
him to a home town in which he felt out of context, and ultimately to his self-
destruction. In the case of Jacques Austerlitz a series of elliptical orbits of Prague, 
both actual and metaphorical, did bring about a realisation – for the narrator at least – 
that there is an extent to which memories of the lost Jewish strata of central European 
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society can be recovered, at least for as long as Kindertransport children such as 
Jacques Austerlitz and Susi Bechhöfer, one of his real-life models, still live; I note in 
passing and with sadness, however, that Susi Bechhöfer died during the time that this 
dissertation was being written. To Sebald this concern must have seemed vital, before 
all trace of European Jewry is lost or only remembered, like the historic Aztec 
language, by some “ancient perroquet” (Austerlitz 210), and it still seems vital in the 
light of the "virtual Jewishness" and “what passes for Jewish culture” in the late 
twentieth-century revival of interest (Gruber 43, 5). Ruth Gruber also reminds us that 
there is “a very fine and dangerous line between appreciating Jews and their culture 
and mythologizing them” (18), which is in effect little better than creating “a 
Potemkin village or sham Eldorado” as the Nazis did out of Theresienstadt (Austerlitz 
341), and which falsifications of history may be why Sebald felt justified in uplifting 
and fictionalising so many genuine stories in his writings. 
One main reason why I take Austerlitz and The Emigrants together is, as I 
have mentioned, that the periscopy of both is bracketed and permeated by the 
consciousness of a peripatetic narrator. In fact it is possible to treat The 
Emigrants, The Rings of Saturn, and Austerlitz as a single oeuvre because of that 
travelling narrator, which is more-or-less what this dissertation does. This means that 
an approach to one text that relies on phenomenology can be argued to be valid for 
all. There are problems, however, when it comes to looking at the protagonist 
of Austerlitz. Much as Max Ferber does, Jacques finds it near impossible to remember 
anything about his central European home, having been brought up Welsh and with a 
new name. Even when he does remember, or at least finds out that he has another 
identity, much of his conscious mental strength goes into suppressing memory. This 
should and does pose an obvious difficulty for a project that aims to present memory 
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as seemingly involuntary strings of associations. Such associations, however, are not 
uniformly reliable. It is impossible to tell which associations will lead, in the next 
instant and the next, to further resonances and repercussions, and which will fade or 
die abruptly giving nothing further. Jacques Austerlitz describes a period in his life 
when his facility of language failed him: 
Now and then a train of thought did succeed in emerging with wonderful clarity 
inside my head, but I knew even as it formed that I was in no position to record 
it, for as soon as I so much as picked up my pencil the endless possibilities of 
language, to which I could once safely abandon myself, became a 
conglomeration of the most inane phrases.  
(173) 
What is illustrated here, as much as any kind of internalised dysphasia, is a fading or 
dying as noted above. When Austerlitz goes on to describe this lived experience as 
being like an exile returning to a city where he once lived, to be faced with not only a 
changing townscape but also the loss of meaning in such mundane things as a bus-
stop or a back yard (174-175), what emerges is an extended metaphor for how 
associations can lead to dissociation, in several senses. Austerlitz describes the 
psychiatric problems relating to this losing touch with language: 
[…] this self-censorship of my mind, the constant suppression of the memories 
surfacing in me […] demanded ever greater efforts and finally, and unavoidably, 
led to the almost total paralysis of my linguistic faculties, the destruction of all 
my notes and sketches, my endless nocturnal peregrinations through London, 
and the hallucinations which plagued me with increasing frequency up to the 
point of my nervous breakdown on the summer of 1992. I cannot say exactly 
how I spent the rest of the year […]  
(198) 
To delve into the specific area of mental health is ultra vires this dissertation, even 
though phenomenology has informed and is still informing that discipline; as has been 
mentioned above, however, although the principles of phenomenology upon which 
this dissertation relies give the impression of a seamless process/procession, Austerlitz 
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presents us with a principle character who actively resists its supposed naturalness, as 
if to say that there is nothing that obliges an individual consciousness simply to enter 
and be swept along by the flow. Jacques Austerlitz appears to struggle against his own 
observation that “[w]e take almost all the decisive steps in our lives as a result of 
slight inner adjustments of which we are barely conscious” (ibid.); even so his 
struggle may not always have been a deliberate one: “I realized then […] how little 
practice I had in using my memory, and conversely how hard I must always have tried 
to recollect as little as possible […]” (197). As he diverts from his real memories to 
the “compensatory memory” of his studies, he comes to inhabit, in effect, a smaller 
and smaller mental space (198). 
Related to this constraint of mental space are both the constraint on his 
physical space and his concept of time. Regarding the former, his own university 
study “was like a stock-room of books and papers with hardly any space left for 
himself, let alone his students” (43), recalling Janine Dakyns’s room (Rings of Saturn 
8) or even Max Ferber’s studio with its collection of bric-a-brac and layers of paint-
flakes (Emigrants 160-161), or, by extension, Gwendolyn Elias’s room full of her 
powder (Austerlitz 86) and the pigeon loft at Königswart full of droppings and dead 
birds (302) the memory of which overwhelmed thoughts of Robert Schumann’s cell 
in Godesberg (301) – such is the intertextuality and intratextuality of Sebald’s writing. 
Although Austerlitz is not actually confined to his university room, his travels are in 
pursuit of his studies of the monumental civic architecture of nineteenth-century 
Europe, examples of which, though often brutally massive, have their own spatial 
issues. The Palace of Justice in Brussels, for example, though a monstrosity of over 
seven hundred thousand cubic metres, is so constrained by the symmetry of its design 
concept, that it contains corridors and stairways leading nowhere, doorless rooms and 
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halls, and empty spaces surrounded by walls (39). He describes to the narrator how he 
“had stopped at one of the windows set deep in the walls to look out over the leaden 
grey roofs of the palace, crammed together like pack ice, and down into ravines and 
shaft-like interior courtyards never penetrated by any ray of light” (ibid.). His 
conflation of the architecture with natural features such as pack ice and ravines 
answers the basic phenomenological question, which may be rendered here as “What 
is encountering this monstrosity of architecture like?” It also recalls the narrator’s 
encounter with the space beyond the hospital window, the inexplicable view from 
which he likens to looking down from a cliff to an ocean of stone or a field of rubble 
(Rings 5). A common experience of consciousness runs throughout the three works 
covered by this dissertation. 
Austerlitz’s theory of time however, set out over three pages, seems unique to 
him. He rejects the solar day as imprecise and our reliance on it as reliance on an 
arbitrary, imaginary, invariable “average sun” (Austerlitz 142) and is instantly at odds 
with the notion of the day as “the most natural measurement of time” (Heidegger 
465). He is impatient also with the idea of time as a river: 
 […] if Newton really thought that time was a river like the Thames, then where 
was its source and into what sea does it finally flow? […] where are the banks of 
time? What would be this river’s qualities perhaps corresponding to those of 
water, which is fluid, rather heavy, and translucent? In what way do objects 
immersed in time differ from those left untouched by it?  
(Austerlitz 142) 
Though time as a metaphorical river may comprehend Newton’s notion of time’s 
equable flow, it also goes back a lot further to Heraclitus’s aphorism that one cannot 
step into the same stream twice (Plato 67). This says nothing about the rate of flow, 
but simply that it does not stand still. Austerlitz’s questions – to which he does not 
stay for an answer – seem superfluous in the light of Heraclitus; the only “bank” is 
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where the observer stands, and is itself a metaphor for the perception of a constant 
present, and whether that observer steps into or merely looks at the river it will have 
changed instant-by-instant, though it may look the same. Source, sea, qualities, etc. 
are irrelevant to that view. Maurice Merleau-Ponty says, in his Phenomenology of 
Perception: 
If the observer sits in a boat and is carried by the current, we may say that he is 
moving downstream towards his future, but the future lies in the new landscapes 
which await him at the estuary, and the course of time is no longer the stream 
itself; it is the landscape as it rolls by for the moving observer. Time is, 
therefore, not a real process, nor an actual succession that I am content to record. 
It arrives from my relation to things.  
(412) 
Although Austerlitz uses the same basic metaphor as Merleau-Ponty, one can imagine 
his demanding to know where the landing stage is at which the observer boards the 
boat, and where the estuary is, where the landscapes are, and indeed what the boat is. 
I will not dwell too much on Merleau-Ponty, as Megan Cawood’s 2007 dissertation 
relates his philosophical stance to Austerlitz in depth, and I do not wish to duplicate 
her work; however I will return to him later in this chapter for one important 
principle. For now it is enough to note that where he and Austerlitz are more 
consonant is in their concentration on the first-person experience of time. Austerlitz 
attempts to reject the governance of time altogether:  
And is not human life in many parts of the earth governed to this day less by 
time than by the weather, and thus by an unquantifiable dimension which 
disregards linear regularity, does not progress constantly forward but moves in 
eddies, is marked by episodes of congestion and irruption, recurs in ever-
changing form, and evolves in no one knows what direction?  
(Austerlitz 143) 
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Thus the changes that time is supposed to measure, Austerlitz claims, are aperiodic 
and capricious. In this he is much closer to Bachelard, for whom “Time no longer 
flows. It spouts” (Instant 60). 
Austerlitz, however, attempts to go much further and rejects the dominance of 
time altogether. He has never owned a clock or worn a wristwatch, keeping himself 
apart from time as it is measured, in the hope that: 
[…] time will not pass away, has not passed away, that I can turn back and go 
behind it, and there I shall find everything as it once was, or more precisely, I 
shall find that all moments of time have coexisted simultaneously, in which case 
none of what history tells us would be true, past events have not yet occurred but 
are waiting to do so at the moment when we think of them […]  
(Austerlitz 144) 
He postulates a kind of retro-time (my coining), a facility for going behind the façade 
of what is perceived as current and encountering there a co-incidental past-and-future 
that may be conjured by one’s consciousness. It seems that he is resisting Walter 
Benjamin’s idea, mentioned in Chapter 2, of history as debris. What he is definitely 
resisting, however, is chronos, which van Manen, citing Heidegger, sees as the kind 
of time that is “continuity, order, and machination” under the spell of which we live, a 
time dominated by technology and production in which there is no scope for grasping 
“human innerness, the imaginal, and the inceptual” (van Manen 821). It is chronos 
that Sebald impishly invokes both by setting Austerlitz’s exposition of time in an 
environment full of “ingenious observational instruments and measuring devices, 
quadrants and sextants, chronometers and regulators,” and by closing the episode with 
the narrator’s noting the clock time (Austerlitz 140, 144). 
Yet Austerlitz’s lived experience of time is indeed an involuntary and an 
instantaneous one. When he enters the billiards room at Iver Grove he makes the 
assumption that “everything was exactly as it must have been a hundred and fifty 
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years before” (149), a statement that is not actually verifiable, hence my emphasis. He 
goes on to describe being in the room thus: “It was as if time, which usually runs so 
irrevocably away, had stood still here, as if the years behind us were still to come 
[…]” (152). Superficially he is expressing his own theory of retro-time, but in fact the 
ringing “as if” phrases that Sebald gives him root him in the instant and in the basic 
phenomenological question, though apart from its superficial retention of bygone 
features there is nothing extraordinary about the room itself, it is simply a space filled 
– here and now – with old-fashioned furniture. Earlier in this chapter it was noted that 
the instant-to-instant nature of lived experience does not afford uniformly outstanding 
associations; the fact that everyday life contains banality is why Heidegger can say 
that everyday experience is both meaningful and superficial (van Manen 811). Yet 
what is most arresting in the texts are the passages in which an association is eidetic, 
where an instant is a threshold for something vivid to spring from memory or 
imagination, such as Luisa Lanzberg’s calling up of the living room of her childhood 
home (Emigrants 195). I call such instants where the threshold nature is so marked 
‘instants of aperture’ – van Manen, as noted before, calls them “imaginal” and 
“inceptual” (821) – a prominent example of which is Austerlitz’s revelation in the 
former Ladies’ Waiting Room at Liverpool Street Station (Austerlitz 189 et seq.). This 
example occurs at the apogee of one of Austerlitz’s ellipses; he is back in Britain, his 
foster-nation and therefore his furthest point of cultural and geographical travel from 
his origin, and his reverie on Liverpool Street is taking him to times and places other 
than his own life, so he is not actively considering his own past. By ‘reverie’ I mean 
“an oneiric activity in which a glimmer of consciousness subsists” (Bachelard, 
Reverie 150) and in which the rêvant is physically present.  
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Austerlitz’s physical presence, in another sense, confronting the space of the 
Waiting Room with its physical confines, contributes to the instant of aperture. Here I 
bring in the principle I referred to earlier: 
[…] this table bears traces of my past life, for I have carved my initials on it and 
spilt ink on it. But these traces in themselves do not refer to the past; they are 
present; and in so far as I find in them signs of some ‘previous’ event, it is 
because I derive my sense of the past from elsewhere, because I carry this 
particular significance within myself.  
(Merleau-Ponty 413, my emphasis) 
The extraordinariness that was lacking in the billiard room at Iver Grove is here in the 
Waiting Room, not by some retention of its own, not by some kind of psychometric 
property, but by the significances that Austerlitz carries around within him. Sebald 
himself said “[t]he past is what we carry with us” (Scott & McCulloh 23). “From time 
to time,” says Austerlitz, “and just for a split second,” he has visions of architectural 
features which, unlike the Palace of Justice, open up and lead into the far distance 
(Austerlitz 190), and throngs of tiny people “like prisoners in search of some way of 
escape” (191). He feels “as if  the room where I stood were expanding, going on for 
ever and ever in an improbably foreshortened perspective” (ibid.). At this instant, for 
Austerlitz, time and space seem to have lost their conventional meaning and he feels 
that he inhabits his retro-time; he has an eidetic mental image of his meeting with his 
foster parents:  
[…] two middle-aged people dressed in the style of the thirties, a woman in a 
light gabardine coat with a hat at an angle on her head, and a thin man beside her 
wearing a dark suit and a dog-collar. And I not only saw the minister and his 
wife, said Austerlitz, I also saw the boy they had come to meet. He was sitting 
by himself on a bench over to one side, his legs, in white knee-length socks, did 
not reach the floor, and but for the small rucksack he was holding on his lap I 
don’t think I would have known him, said Austerlitz. I recognized him by that 
rucksack of his, and for the first time in as far back as I can remember I 
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recollected myself as a small child, at the moment when I realized that it must 
have been to this same waiting-room I had come on my arrival in England over 
half a century ago.  
(193) 
However, notwithstanding the remembered meeting’s authenticity, this is fictive 
memory, filled out if not wholly created by his imagination. He does not see as he 
saw then, but looks on at himself as a spectator would watching Bachelard’s “theater 
of the past” (Space 30). This passage brings together the four phenomenological 
concepts I mentioned in chapter 1: event, place, vector, and object. Event and place, 
the instantaneous emergence of this memory, and the space in which the instant 
occurs have a significance carried to them by Austerlitz himself. The vector is the 
particular elliptical journey to them, its reaching the apogee from which point the 
course will be back towards the perigee, the significance of the journey emerging 
through the event and the place again by what Austerlitz has carried with him. The 
object, literally carried with him, is his ubiquitous rucksack, his dependence upon 
which throughout his life is now made clear by its presence in the quasi-theatrical 
memory. 
The novel itself, however, does not end with any such theatricality. It does not 
even end with the presence of Austerlitz himself, but with the sense that it is the 
narrator who had been on an elliptical vector throughout. He has travelled from the 
magnificent, domed great hall of the Centraal Station, where he first saw Austerlitz 
sitting like an erect Siegfried amongst a collection of “miniaturized” Nibelungen-like 
passengers (Austerlitz 6), via all his encounters with his semi-fictitious protagonist, to 
their last meeting where Austerlitz tells him of the “almost dwarf-like woman” who 
was the caretaker at the Alderney Street cemetery (409). With that in his mind, the 
narrator goes not to that cemetery but to Antwerp and Machelen, walking ten 
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kilometres from there to Willebroek in a reverie in which he, like Austerlitz in parvo, 
forgets most of what he saw on the way (411). At the fortifications of Breendonk he 
immerses himself, and the reader of the novel, in some details from Dan Jacobson’s 
Heshel’s Kingdom, which Austerlitz had given to him at their first meeting, thus 
bearing periscopic witness to the significance which he, Sebald/narrator, has carried 
with him throughout. Once again we can refer to André Aciman’s note in “Out of 
Novemberland,” to the effect that whilst Sebald does not talk directly about the 
Holocaust, we think of nothing else (6). It is the “neuf cent français” and the names of 
Lob, Abram, and Stern scratched on a wall that he leaves us with (415) – not the 
industrial homicide of the Holocaust itself but the ephemera of people who once made 
up strata integral to the sociology and culture of central Europe, and who, Sebald 
reminds us by allowing Austerlitz to fade from the novel that bears his name, have 





The core chapters of this dissertation have presented three Sebald texts as, in 
effect, a continuous work demonstrating the phenomenological experience, and a 
phenomenological approach to the creation of literature. Rather than simply 
functioning as a conventional summary and conclusion, this briefer final chapter will 
ask first of all, where that presentation as a hypothesis can be challenged and where it 
can be further supported. It has already been noted that whilst the experience of 
phenomena can only be a first-person one, Sebald relies heavily on periscopy. It has 
also been noted that the experience is instantaneous, whereas The Rings of Saturn, for 
example, apparently took two to three years from the walking tour, via the assembly 
of notes, to publication in English. The preceding chapters have given sufficient 
evidence of the phenomenological approach and content, but the deliberation of 
Sebald’s process of creation has also to be kept in mind. The level of deliberation 
involved is increased when translation is considered. British writer and filmmaker 
Iain Sinclair reminds us that when we read The Rings of Saturn “we’re not even 
reading Sebald’s book, we’re reading a book by Michael Hulse […] There’s a 
strategy that [Sebald] doesn’t write directly in English. He writes in German, and then 
it’s translated” (Patience). The presence of Michael Hulse that markedly in the 
process of creation would seem to take us one step further from the “raw, 
prereflective, nonreflective” nature of experience (van Manen 812). Sinclair pointedly 
refers to the process as a “strategy,” signifying planning and forethought, rather than 
spontaneity, on the part of writer and translators. A letter from Sebald to Hulse in 
1994, regarding a section of The Emigrants, introduces yet another person into the 
process: 
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Over the last couple of weeks  I have looked through the Selwyn story once 
more together with Beryl Ranwell who has often helped me in the past with that 
sort of work. We made several more minor changes, often where I found that the 
German text was a little flawed or could otherwise be adjusted so that 
unnecessary difficulties could be avoided. I enclose a copy of amended version 
as well as your text with marks showing where changes were made. I hope you 
will find this all right. It was only through working on the text myself that I fully 
came to appreciate your excellent translation, the way in which you found the 
right tone & the skill with which you got round the many difficulties the original 
presents.  
(Sebald, Correspondence) 
Beryl Ranwell was a secretary at the University of East Anglia, who worked firstly in 
the Russian Sector of the School of European Studies, and thereafter in the German 
Sector. During her time there she assisted Sebald with translations from German into 
English, and he publicly acknowledged her vital role, saying “she has a good ear for 
English – which I certainly don’t” (Turner). Sebald’s acknowledgement of Hulse as, 
in effect, the owner of the finished work-in-translation is there in the simple 
expression “I hope you will find this all right.” Sebald thereby puts himself at arm’s 
length from the finished work. 
A further indication of how the minutiae of Sebald’s texts were given attention 
can be seen in the way the epigraph that precedes “Dr. Henry Selwyn” – “Zerstöret 
das Letzte die Errinerung nicht” (Ausgewanderten 5) – migrates via “Destroy not the 
last of memory” to “And the last remnants memory destroys” (Hulse), neither of 
which is a precise translation and the final one arguably reverses the sense of the 
original. However, chapter 3 of this dissertation has drawn attention not simply to the 
disruptive effect of some of Hulse’s minor quirks of translation in The Emigrants, but 
also to the way in which one example allowed a manipulation and foreshortening of 
time. This compliments the way in which space or perspective is often foreshortened 
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in the texts. Hulse’s presence as translator, or Anthea Bell’s in the case of Austerlitz, 
may add another stage to the overall periscopy, but the preceding chapters of this 
dissertation evidence that this does not detract from what Sebald is trying to achieve – 
from his documentary purpose of highlighting the ignored barbarities of the twentieth 
century, “the ethical necessity of bearing witness to the present and the past” (Cooke 
145). This dissertation has already noted that Sebald keeps the Holocaust in the minds 
of readers (Aciman 6); Simon Cooke gives the following opinion in Travellers’ Tales 
of Wonder:  
Sebald’s work, for all the self-conscious and arguably postmodern sense of the 
relativity of experience, seems guided at all times by a wish not to trespass on 
the experience itself. The consciousness of the mediatedness of the account, both 
visually and textually, never strives for telekinetic or appropriative intensity, but 
rather points outside its own frame of reference towards that which cannot be 
captured. […] Sebald’s forms of witness strive for a kind of receptivity that […] 
evokes, rather than contains, the experiences of others.  
(149-150) 
Although Cooke doubts the phenomenological directness of the texts, using terms 
such as “trespass” and “appropriative,” he cannot deny that Sebald “evokes” the 
experiences; and if the experiences can be evoked, then so can the associations that 
every successive experience brings with it. Far from being a stumbling block to what 
Sebald is trying to achieve, Sebald’s writing “literally comes into being […] through 
acts of translation” (164). Translators often try to convey as much as possible of the 
culture of the originator; thus one would expect more than a hint of German-ness in a  
Hulse or Bell translation. However, what is often produced is something shorn of that 
sense of the narrator’s exotism, by virtue again of careful attention to minutiae. Hence 
“der ostenglische Stadt Norwich” (Ausgewanderten 7) becomes simply “Norwich” 
(Emigrants 3). Thus a text emerges that in effect does not separate the reader from the 
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narrator by culture or ethnicity, but further helps to collapse the possible distancing 
inherent in periscopy.  
It is to such detailing as mentioned above that Lynne Sharon Schwartz refers 
when she writes of Sebald’s “dreamlike narratives, meandering yet meticulous […]” 
(9). Some narratives within the texts refer directly to oneiric experience, such as Max 
Ferber’s dream about a man with a model of Solomon’s temple at Jerusalem which he 
took from ghetto to ghetto – a miniaturisation taken from microcosm to microcosm, 
each a constriction of space (Emigrants 176). There is an intra/intertextual link 
between that dream and the meeting between the narrator of The Rings of Saturn and 
the builder of an actual scale model of the same temple, noted in chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. This now draws our attention to the more general factor in the texts under 
consideration, the use of coincidence. Chapter 3 noted that Sebald had an ambivalent 
attitude towards coincidence, disliking the sleight of hand that tied coincidences 
neatly together in popular murder mysteries; using a coincidence to some end “would 
trivialize it,” he said, admitting that nevertheless coincidences in his writing had 
significance (Cuomo 97). This dissertation has already noted the recurrences like 
those of the constrained space of cluttered rooms, of domed structures, and of the 
unfamiliar views from on high. Michaël Zeeman’s interview confronted Sebald over 
the far-fetchedness of the narrator’s being told the story of alpine guide Johannes 
Naegli falling from a mountain many years before (Emigrants 15) and being in the 
neighbourhood seventy or eighty years afterwards when his body is recovered, and 
moreover being about to lay aside a newspaper carrying the account when realising it 
is the same man (23); to this confrontation, Sebald replied “That’s his story. Well, I 
mean, this is also to unsettle the reader of course” (Sebald and Zeeman 26). This 
coincidence in itself not only unsettles the reader, of course, but sets up the 
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expectation of further coincidences, especially the expectation that the Butterfly Man 
encountered later throughout The Emigrants is in fact Selwyn, and that there will be 
some sort of resolution or explanation of the encounters. The fact that there is none 
turns attention back to the actual experience of the encounters, as noted in chapter 3. 
There are smaller unresolved coincidences, such as the discovery of master dyer 
Seybolt, whose name and possible Bavarian origin is tantalisingly close to Sebald’s 
own (Rings 287), hinting at but never revealing a more direct connection. However, it 
is in Austerlitz where coincidence is put under most strain. Austerlitz is led to the 
place of his major instant of aperture, the old waiting room at Liverpool Street Station 
by “a series of coincidences” (195), having felt that he had been bidden to enter it by 
a station worker in a white turban who acted almost like a deus ex machina, or at least 
a catalyst to the story (188-189). The narrator speaks of Austerlitz’s “unexpected 
return” (54), but covers the contrived coincidences of their repeated meetings – which 
are necessary within the structure of the book for Austerlitz to tell his whole story – 
by saying “Contrary to all statistical probability, then, there was an astonishing, 
positively imperative internal logic to his meeting me here” (60). This is almost to 
acknowledge Austerlitz’s apparent belief in an agency greater than or superior to his 
own capacity for thought, and which directs operations somewhere in his brain (ibid.) 
as being responsible also for bringing them together.  
This stretching of coincidences stands beside what can be considered the least 
credible occurrence in Austerlitz – the reconnection with the Czech language. 
Austerlitz recounts “now [I] understood almost everything Vĕra said, like a deaf man 
whose hearing had been miraculously restored” (219). We are meant to accept that a 
man should ‘remember’, sixty years later, more than the vocabulary and syntax 
familiar to a very young child, particularly if he has up to then been struggling to 
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stammer out learnt Czech phrases (215), particularly a man who had previously 
likened himself to someone who had forgotten what a bus-stop or back yard was 
(175). However, what is being conveyed here is an instant of aperture of great 
intensity. This is borne out by the typically Sebaldian “as if” phrase, though here it is 
introduced by “like.” We can choose to take literally what Austerlitz says about his 
rediscovered facility with Czech, or we can accept this as yet another answer to the 
basic phenomenological question, and see his statement as a description of what the 
experience is like. The unsettling effect that Sebald has been aiming for in episodes 
like this, and in the coincidences, is to prompt the reader to see how much one thing 
was like another, “as if” a view in The Rings of Saturn is a view in Austerlitz, or “as 
if” an artist’s studio in The Emigrants is a pigeon loft in Austerlitz and so on. 
Coincidence becomes co-incidence, there is “[an] interconnection of different times 
and places in one another” (Cooke 163), and the significance that Sebald himself cited 
in his conversation with Joseph Cuomo is carried not only by the narrator[s] and 
characters, but now by the reader to each coincidence. The documentary film 
Patience: After Sebald contains the reactions of several notable readers of The Rings 
of Saturn. In the film, Barbara Hui and Rick Moody deal with Sebald’s intention to 
unsettle the reader by focusing on aspects of the interconnection that Cooke refers to. 
Hui’s ‘Litmap’ project takes all the places visited and connected them by straight 
lines to every other place mentioned in the text. Moody responds to the narrator’s 
mental pilgrimage by linking themes in flowcharts. Superficially, both reactions seem 
to be a retreat into linearity, but rather they are attempts to come to come to terms 
with the unfamiliarity and unpredictability of phenomenological associations. Lise 
Patt is well aware of the linear nature of a narrative, but also of the way this can be 
disrupted; she reports being struck by the subtle repetition of shapes in images on 
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pages 57 and 58 of The Rings of Saturn, and then coming across the stark interruption 
of the double page image on pages 60 and 61, which drew her back to the photo on 
page 54, and caused her to retrace her steps. “It’s very hard to do this […] to use […] 
the linearity of a book, and to use the images to pull you back. That’s why it’s like a 
journey even as you’re reading it, because you’re constantly having to go back” 
(Patience). This is not unique in the texts. On pages 10 to 13 of Austerlitz the reader 
has to give in to either doggedly following the narrative, or accepting the diversions 
afforded by images and footnotes; even following the narrative leads to the minor 
puzzle of an untranslated motto in Dutch. Sebald again is deliberate in the way he 
evokes the tangential and disruptive nature of associations. 
This point brings the ‘peripatesis’ of the dissertation to an end. Its vector has 
been, as I said at the start, a peregrinatory one. That has been necessary to convey the 
connectedness of and within the three texts, to demonstrate that there is sufficient 
evidence, despite the potential challenges, to support a phenomenological approach to 
Sebald, and to show that such an approach has both value and validity. Throughout 
the parts of the text that have been examined, the importance of the experience of the 
instant as a threshold to resonances, repercussions, and associations has been shown. 
In concluding this dissertation and, for the time being, this project, I am well aware 
that there is much ground still to cover. To reiterate its purpose, the door for further 
study of this nature is now open wider, and I have no doubt that it is a threshold that 
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